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II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Court of Appeals in City of St. George v. 
Brent Allen Turner, Case No. 890620-CA, (filed June 6, 1991, Utah 
Court of Appeals) reversed the decision of Judge Mower of the 
Fifth Circuit Court, St. George Department denying Brent Allen 
Turners Motion to Dismiss the criminal Complaint against him. 
Mr. Turner was charged with violation of the St. George City 
Obscenity Ordinance, Ordinance No. 2-77-2. Mr. Turner's Motion 
to Dismiss before Judge Mower was based upon the argument that 
the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face, or had been 
applied unconstitutionally to Mr. Turner. The Utah Court of 
Appeals, exercising the independent appellate review mandated by 
the United States Supreme Court, determined that the statute was 
constitutional on its face, but had been unconstitutionally 
applied to Mr. Turner. (See pages 1, 7-8 of the Utah Court of 
Appeals opinion in Case No. 890620-CA, attached hereto as 
Appendix 1.) 
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III. 
WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED 
A. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 49, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Both the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and prior 
case law of this Court make it abundantly clear that a party 
petitioning for a writ of certiorari must precisely follow the 
rules with regard to the form of the petition, and must 
specifically set forth the reasons why the writ should issue. In 
Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 
1978), this Court stated: 
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction 
that pleadings seeking relief by way of 
certiorari must specifically designate the . 
. . abuse of discretion claimed and that 
pleadings that merely set forth conclusions 
are to be dismissed. 
Id. at 582. Additionally, Rule 49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure directs petitioner to set forth: "A direct 
and concise argument explaining the special and important reasons 
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the writ." Rule 49 
goes on to state at sub-paragraph lOe that: 
"The failure of a petitioner to present with 
accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is 
essential to a ready and adequate 
understanding of the points requiring 
consideration will be a sufficient reason for 
denying the petition." 
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The City of St. George's petition for a writ of 
certiorari in this case fails to set forth concisely or otherwise 
exactly what the Utah Court of Appeals did wrong and why, and 
fails to identify reasons why this Court should review the Court 
of Appeals' decision. Although the petition sets forth in a 
rambling unsupported fashion a litany of conclusions regarding 
what the Utah Court of Appeals really should have done, the
 m 
petition never sets forth in what respect the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision deviated from the recognized standard. The 
petition is, in every respect, no more than the City's 
unsupported notions of what the law ought to be, rather than what 
the law is. At no point does the petition concisely and 
accurately set forth the reasons under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure why certiorari should be granted. The 
petition is actually just a reargument of the City's position as 
set forth to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the petition 
should be denied. 
B. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
Giving petitioner every benefit of the doubt, 
apparently petitioner contends that the Utah Court of Appeals did 
not utilize the correct standard of review when considering the 
3 
Circuit Court's decision to deny Turner's Motion to Dismiss. 
That argument, however, ignores the clear pronouncements of the 
United States Supreme Court which have directly and unequivocally 
addressed this very issue. 
This Court need not look beyond the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision and the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in two cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals 
appropriately considered Mr. Turner's appeal. 
First, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L. Ed. 
2d 642 (1974), a case decided after Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973) upon which petitioner so 
persistently relies, the United States Supreme Court concisely 
set forth what the role of appellate courts should be when 
reviewing convictions for violations of local obscenity 
ordinances and statutes. In Jenkins the Court considered Mr. 
Jenkins' conviction under a Georgia obscenity statute and faced 
the precise argument that the City of St. George is attempting in 
this case. Georgia argued that the decision of the jury, as the 
trier of fact applying local community standards, should stand 
and should not be reviewed independently at the appellate level. 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, cited extensively to 
Miller v. California, and announced that appellate courts have 
the right and duty to conduct an independent review of the facts 
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to ensure that only hard core depictions of sexual conduct will 
be the subject of prosecution, regardless of what local juries 
may deem fit or appropriate. The United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Renquist writing for the majority stated: 
Even though questions of appeal to 'prurient 
interest or of patent offensiveness' are 
essentially questions of fact, it would be a 
serious misreading of Miller to conclude that 
juries have unbridled discretion in 
determining what is 'patently offensive'. 
Not only did we there say that 'the First 
Amendment values applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment are 
adequately protected by the ultimate power of 
appellate courts to conduct an independent 
review of constitutional claims when 
necessary' (citations omitted) but we made it 
plain under that holding 'no one will be 
subject to prosecution for the sale or 
exposure of obscene materials unless these 
materials depict or describe patently 
offensive hard core sexual conduct'. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 650. (Emphasis added.) In spite of the United States' 
Supreme Court warning that it would be a serious misreading of 
Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion, that is 
precisely what the City of St. George has done. In its petition 
the City states: "The sensitive issue of standards in a 
particular community should not be infringed upon once the 
court's initial constitutional review shows that it may be 
possible for obscenity to exist." (See petition for writ of 
certiorari at 13-14.) That statement is patently contrary to the 
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United States Supreme Court's pronouncement that an independent 
review of constitutional claims is permitted by appellate courts 
and that juries do not have unbridled discretion in determining 
what is patently offensive and therefore, obscene. Recognizing 
its obligation under Jenkins, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
"Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of 'hard coreness that 
must be meet.'" (See page 6 of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision.) Furthermore, the Court of Appeals recognized and 
quoted directly from Jenkins stating: 
When determining what appeals to the prurient 
interest and what is patently offensive, the 
jury is not allowed unbridled discretion. 
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974). 
The trial judge has a significant role in 
defining the extent of the jury's discretion. 
'Application of the obscenity standards 
involves a subjective element on the part of 
the tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the 
critical determination.' (Citations 
omitted.) In addition, jury discretion is 
subject to independent appellate review, when 
necessary, and by the requirement that only 
depictions of patently offensive hard core 
sexual conduct be subject to prosecution. 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160. Therefore, in 
Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not hesitate 
to invade the province of the jury, which the 
Georgia Supreme Court had refused to do. 
Id. at 6. The Utah Court of Appeals' ennunciation of the 
standard of review precisely mirrors what the United States 
Supreme Court mandated in Jenkins. 
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Additionally, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S. 
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection in Jenkins of the 
contention that a jury finding of obscenity is insulated from 
review so long as the jury was properly instructed and there is 
some evidence to support its findings. On the contrary, the 
United States Supreme Court held that an independent examination 
of the evidence by the appellate court was appropriate. The 
court in Bose stated: 
We expressly recognize the 'ultimate power of 
appellate courts to conduct an independent 
review of constitutional claims when 
necessary'. (Citations omitted.) We have 
therefore rejected the contention that a jury 
finding of obscenity vel non is insulated 
from review so long as the jury was properly 
instructed and there is some evidence to 
support its findings, holding that 
substantive constitutional limitations 
govern. In Jenkins v. Georgia, (citations 
omitted) based on an independent examination 
of the evidence . . . the Court held that the 
film in question fcould not, as a matter of 
constitutional law, be found to depict sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way.' 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 506-507. (Emphasis added.) This Court should likewise 
reject petitioner's argument that a jury verdict in an obscenity 
case is insulated from independent appellate review. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held exactly as the Court did 
in Jenkins, utilizing exactly the same language: 
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Our review of the evidence leads us to the 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, these 
renderings are not public portrayals of hard 
core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for 
the ensuing commercial gain. Jenkins, 418 
U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35). 
(See Appendix 1, the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, at page 8.) 
Petitioner's suggestion that the Utah Court of Appeals expanded, 
or misapplied the standard of review mandated by the United 
States Supreme Court is unsupportable. Rather, the Utah Court of 
Appeals undertook the same level and nature of appellate review 
mandated by Jenkins and reaffirmed in Bose. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
St. George has failed to concisely and accurately 
articulate reasons why this Court should issue a writ of 
certiorari. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, there is no 
good reason under Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate procedure or 
under any other recognizable authority for this Court to issue a 
writ of certiorari in this matter. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
City of St. George, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Brent Allen Turner, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MS^T. Noomin 
Clerk of tht Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890620-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 6, 1991) 
Fifth Circuit, St. George Department 
The Honorable David L. Mower 
Attorneys: Michael P. Zaccheo, Salt Lake City, for Appellant, 
Alan B. Boyack, St. George, for Appellant 
T. M. Shumway, St. George, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, Brent Allen Turner, appeals his conviction of 
displaying an obscene picture depicting sexual conduct in 
violation of St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2. We reverse, 
FACTS 
Turner operated a retail business in St. George, Utah, 
vending hard rock record albums and T-shirts. Turner's small, 
signless store was open during evening hours only. He was 
charged with violating the St. George obscenity ordinance for 
his display of three painted bed sheets which he used as wall 
hangings and which were visible to anyone entering the shop. 
Several people made their "artistic" contributions to the 
sheets as they hung on the wall. The sheets appear to be a 
collage consisting of various drawings and slogans in different 
sizes and styles. The paint appears to have been sprayed or 
brushed on. The pictures and slogans appear crude and 
simplistic. Several factors make some of the slogans and 
drawings impossible to discern from the record: the quality of 
the photographs in the exhibit, the draping of the sheets, and 
the fact that some stereo speakers appear in front of the 
sheets in the photographs. The slogans and drawings appear 
intended to confront and to offend, and are related to sexual, 
political, religious, and social themes. The portion of the 
wall hangings that the prosecution claims violates the St, 
George ordinance supposedly portrays a woman reclining in a 
spread-eagled manner so as to expose her "pubic area," 
represented by three or four black paint spots. The face and 
head of the figure could conceivably be that of a dog. Next to 
the drawing of the woman is what has been represented to be an 
enlarged drawing of a woman's pubic area. Both renditions are 
crudely drawn, blurry and indistinct. The quality of the 
renderings could best be compared to the graffiti and drawings 
frequently found on the walls of a junior high school rest 
room. 
Turner was charged with violating St. George City 
Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 §§ 2a(l) and (2). The relevant 
portions of this lengthy ordinance are as follows: 
No person shall knowingly: (1) Distribute, 
display publicly, furnish or provide to 
any person any obscene material or 
performance. 
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § 2a(l). "Obscene" is 
defined as 
1. The slogans include "Nuke My Ass," "Your [sic] Afraid Face 
it," "Group Sex," "Total Peace," "Fuck Authority," "Burn the 
Dead," "Eat It," "Live-Die Airborne," "Hell House," "Kill for 
God," "Run and Hide Death Will Find You!," "Sold Your Soul," 
"White Flys [sic] Will Eat Your Flesh," "The End," "And Unto 
You I Dedicate My Heart," and "My Right to The World." The 
drawings include a peace symbol, an MX missile, a swastika, 
some gravestones, some crosses, some international prohibitive 
symbols over the words "life" and "drugs," a smiling face, a 
gun, several skulls, some with cross bones, some with full 
skeletons, a door, a mushroom cloud, and a moon. 
2. The dissent's description of the two drawings gives the 
impression one is looking at an explicit medical illustration 
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any material or performance which, when 
taken as a whole and considered in the 
context of the contemporary standards of 
this community: 
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex; 
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive manner; 
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § la. The ordinance 
provides a lengthy definition of "sexual conduct," the relevant 
portion of which is as follows: 
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory 
function or lewd exhibition of the 
genitals, including any explicit close-up 
representation of a human genital organ or 
a spread eagle exposure of female genital 
organs. 
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le (emphasis added). 
A jury found Turner guilty. He now appeals his 
conviction on the grounds that (1) the obscenity ordinance was 
unconstitutional as applied to him, and (2) the ordinance is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
from Gray's Anatomy, or viewing an exact photograph of the area 
in question, leaving no room for dispute as to what the 
renditions depict. Such is simply not the case. The second 
drawing, described in such intimate detail, could just as 
easily be viewed as a beetle, a leaf, or a Zulu war shield. Or 
it might more closely resemble a fugitive ink blot from the 
Rorschach test ("A personality and intelligence test in which a 
subject interprets ten standard black or colored inkblot 
designs and reveals through his selectivity the manner in which 
intellectual and emotional factors are integrated in his 
perception of environmental stimuli." Webster's Medical Desk 
Dictionary (1986)). Because the drawings were sufficiently 
abstract so as to permit a variety of nonobscene 
interpretations, and because of the other reasons enumerated 
later in this opinion, the judge, as a matter of law, should 
have never permitted the issue to go to the jury. 
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FIRST AMENDMENT 
In a case where we are required to weigh important first 
amendment values of freedom of speech against a charge of 
obscenity based on a statute or ordinance that is properly 
limited, we exercise independent review when necessary, and 
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, whether the 
material is to be protected. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 
160 (1974).3 
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth its definition of obscenity. 
The standard has been elaborated in subsequent cases, and it 
remains the standard for distinguishing between speech, which 
is protected by the first amendment of the United States . 
Constitution, and obscenity, which is not considered speech and 
receives no such protection. Id. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I 
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 485 (1957).5 
3. "[T]he First Amendment values applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by 
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an 
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). See also, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163-64 
(Brennan, J. concurring). 
4. For example, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. Inc., 472 U.S. 
491 (1985) (elaboration of prurient interest); and Jenkins, 418 
U.S. 153 (elaboration of community standards). 
5. The prosecution argues that, because the record shop is 
near a school and because minors are likely to frequent the 
shop, we should apply the lower standard suggested in Erznoznik 
v- CitY Of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (discussing 
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of speech). 
However, the St. George ordinance fails to regulate the time, 
place, or manner that sexually explicit material may be 
displayed, but instead, it places a content-based restriction 
on any display of sexually explicit material. Consequently, we 
must apply the stricter test set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15. 
Additionally, because the shop is unmarked and is only open 
evenings, when school is not in session, it does not appear 
that minors are especially likely to frequent the shop. 
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The Miller test is as follows: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of 
fact must be: (a) whether the average 
person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24 (quotations and citations omitted). The Miller 
test is basically incorporated into the St. George ordinance, 
except that the ordinance defines "sexual conduct" in ways not 
specifically mentioned in Miller. Specifically, the St. George 
ordinance prohibits the display of "any explicit close-up 
representation of . . . a spread eagle exposure of female 
genital organs." St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le. 
However, among the "plain examples" given by the Miller court 
as to what a statute or ordinance can define for regulation as 
patently offensive sexual conduct was the "lewd exhibition of 
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. We find that, insofar 
as the definition describes materials that "depict or describe 
patently offensive 'hard core* sexual conduct" and insofar as 
that sexual conduct passes muster under the Miller test, which 
it must under section 1(a) of the ordinance, the ordinance is 
within constitutional limits.6 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27). 
PRURIENT INTEREST AND 
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE 
The first prong of the Miller analysis requires the trier 
of fact to determine whether the "'average person, applying 
contemporary community standards1 would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). 
6. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not consider 
whether the depiction at issue is lewd. 
ooncjn_r& S 
Material that appeals to the prurient interest does not 
include "material that provoke[s] only normal, healthy sexual 
desires." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 U.S. 491, 498 
(1985). Rather, it applies to material that provokes "sexual 
responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as 
normal." Id. Specifically, "prurience may be constitutionally 
defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which 
appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex . . . ." Id, 
at 504. 
The second prong of the Miller analysis is "whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." 
Miller. 413 U.S. at 24. 
When determining what appeals to the prurient interest 
and what is patently offensive, the jury is not allowed 
unbridled discretion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 
(1974). The trial judge has a significant role in defining the 
extent of the jury's discretion. "Application of the obscenity 
standard involves a subjective element on the part of the 
tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the critical 
determination." Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974)). In addition, jury discretion is subject to 
independent appellate review, when necessary, and by the 
requirement that only depictions of patently offensive hard 
core sexual conduct be subject tp prosecution. Jenkins, 418 
U.S. at 160. Therefore, in Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not 
hesitate to invade the province of the jury, which the Georgia 
Supreme Court had refused to do. In overturning the verdict, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did not have sole 
discretion to determine that the film Carnal Knowledge was 
obscene, and substituted its judgment for that of the jury 
because, it concluded, it was "simply not the 'public portrayal 
of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commercial gain' which we said was punishable in 
Miller." 418 U.S. at 162 (quoting MiUfii, 413 U.S. at 35). 
Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of "hard-coreness-
that must be met. 
Not only must the statute or ordinance be 
constitutionally explicit, but the trial court has the 
responsibility to make a threshold determination as to whether 
a work may depict hard-core sexual conduct. Only after the 
court has reached this conclusion is it appropriate to turn the 
matter over to the jury to apply the first two prongs of the 
Miller test. Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court 
correctly made the threshold determination contemplated in 
Jenkins. The court, in its pretrial order denying a motion to 
dismiss, found that "the words and drawing described herein 
7. in a recent case, State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
(1991), the Utah Supreme Court commented on the distinctions 
between the overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury. 
Even though Ramirez was concerned with the admission of 
eyewitness identification, we find the court's comments 
appropriate here where the trial court has to make a 
preliminary determination of obscenity when that same issue 
will have to be redetermined by the jury when the evidence is 
considered: 
Potential for role confusion and for 
erosion of constitutional guarantees 
inheres in this overlap of responsibility 
of judge and jury to determine the same 
issue. Because the jury is not bound by 
the judge's preliminary factual 
determination made in ruling on 
admissibility[/obscenity] the trial court 
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as 
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize 
proffered evidence for constitutional 
defects and may simply admit the evidence, 
leaving all questions pertinent to its 
reliabilityf/obscenity] to the jury. But 
courts cannot properly sidestep their 
responsibility to perform the required 
constitutional admissibility[/obscenity3 
analysis. To do so would leave protection 
of constitutional rights to the whim of a 
jury and would abandon the courts' 
responsibility to apply the law. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. 
8. "Judges . . . must take care lest they decide these cases 
on the basis simply of their indignation and disgust with the 
kind of trash presented. The First Amendment extends to trash, 
if it stops short of obscenity . . . ." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 
396. Even though a piece may be "dismally unpleasant, uncouth 
and tawdry," that alone "is not enough to make [it] 
•obscene. "• Manual Enter, v. Dav, 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962). 
onrt^in /"»* n 
arguably suggest an act which would constitute a violation of 
the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital contact." 
While the spray painted drawings depict representations 
of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be 
salacious or titillating or to provoke sexual responses, normal 
or healthy, much less those that are "over and beyond those 
that would be characterized as normal." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 
498. "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the 
States1 broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such 
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The arresting officer 
admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are 
vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy 
and abstract to appeal "to a shameful or morbid interest in 
sex." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.9 The trial court's pretrial 
finding of an "arguable suggestion" is not sufficient to meet 
the constitutional test, and our own review of the evidence 
leads us to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, these 
renderings are not "public portrayal[s] of hard-core sexual 
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial 
gain." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 
35) . 
Moreover, we cannot judge the drawings in isolation, but 
must also consider the written material and other symbols 
because Miller requires us to view the collage "taken as a 
whole" in determining its appeal, to the prurient interest. 413 
U.S. at 24. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972),10 the 
9. "The First Amendment protection for the depiction of nude 
women applies even . . . where the pictures focus upon the 
pubic areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize 
the female genitalia." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 401. 
10. Although Kois preceded Miller, Miller frequently cites the 
case with approval, indicating an intent to reaffirm the 
decision and its analysis. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 24, 25, 26, 
35, 37. Also, the test in Kois was whether "to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest." Kois, 408 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United 
Stafcfifi, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). Although this phrase 
implies that the Kois phrase "taken as a whole" applies only to 
the first part of the Miller test, the crux of Kois was whether 
an allegedly obscene depiction had political value. We think 
the Kflia analysis of "taken as a whole" is helpful in both the 
first and third prongs of the Miller test. 
Supreme Court considered the context in which an allegedly-
obscene work was displayed. Kois involved the publication of a 
photograph of an embracing nude couple, similar to one 
confiscated by a Wisconsin district attorney. Because the 
accompanying article was about the confiscation, the Court held 
that the picture was newsworthy and thus protected. Laying a 
foundation for what would later be the third prong of the 
Miller analysis, the Court held that context could redeem an 
otherwise obscene picture, where there is some contextual 
relativity between the offending portion and the rest of the 
work: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will 
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication." 
408 U.S. at 231. The Court held that because the picture was 
"rationally related" and "relevant to the theme of the 
article," it was "clearly entitled" to protection. Id. 
Here, the two drawings do not appear as a sham attempt to 
insulate obscene material with protected material. That is, 
while the two drawings may be more confrontational and vulgar 
than what appears on the rest of the bedsheets, they are not 
entirely out of context with the other depictions of political, 
philosophical, musical, social and sexual themes. Because the 
work is a collage, there is not a close relationship among all 
the slogans and symbols. However, a close relationship is not 
the requirement; a rational relationship is. Kois, 407 U.S. at 
231. n 
The two drawings meet the Kois test because they 
rationally relate to the immediate context (the wall hangings) 
and to the broader context (the record store). The immediate 
context is a collage of various symbols and phrases. The 
broader context is that of a hard rock record store which vends 
heavy metal music, which music is intended, in part, to 
challenge traditional ideas and modes of thinking. 
Therefore, even if we were to concede, which we do not, 
that the two key drawings appeal to the prurient interest and 
are patently offensive, we cannot see how the entire collage, 
taken as a whole, is so. 
11. The Kois Court's use of the phrase "rationally related" 
suggests a low level of integration between an offending 
picture and its larger context. See E. Main, The Neglected 
Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, 
Artistic, Political, or Scientific Value, 11 S. 111. Univ. L.J. 
1159, 1163-64 (1987). 
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Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
drawings themselves do not appeal to the prurient interest and 
are not patently offensive, and because the drawings rationally 
relate to the rest of the collage, which, taken as a whole, is 
not patently offensive and does not appeal to the prurient 
interest, we find that the drawings are not in violation of the 
St. George ordinance. 
e conviction, 
Regnal W Garff, Judge. 
I CONCUR: 
« w 
Gregorj^K. Orme, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
INTRODUCTION 
I would affirm Mr. Turner's conviction. He was tried by a 
jury of his peers and found guilty of violating an ordinance 
which specifically defined constitutionally obscene materials. 
Mr. Turner was provided fair notice that lewd exhibition of 
human genitals to the St. George public, including spread-eagle 
exposure of female genital organs, would bring prosecution. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) provides "plain 
examples of what a state statute [or city ordinance] could 
define [as obscenity] for regulation . . . ." One of Miller's 
plain examples of "hard core" sexual conduct is representation 
of "lewd exhibition of the genitals." Ixl. Thus, the trial 
judge could reasonably determine that the ordinance contained a 
constitutionally proper and specific definition of obscenity 
and that Turner's exhibition of the nude spread-eagle female 
and a separate enlarged detailed vulva with open vagina, 
exposed labia and clitoris was in violation of the 
constitutionally valid ordinance. Accordingly, the trial judge 
properly submitted the case to the jury for determination after 
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based only on submission 
of Turner's drawings and the city ordinance. The jury saw the 
materials, heard the evidence and determined that Turner's 
materials were obscene and that he had displayed them to 
unwarned members of the public in violation of the city 
ordinance. *-
FACTS 
The statement of "facts" in the main opinion reads like a 
subjective treatise in art appreciation, assessing the quality 
of Turner's art work as "crude," "simplistic," "abstract," 
"indistinct" and "blurry." However, this attack of adjectives 
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not indicated that 
tasteful, mature, high quality obscenity should be suppressed 
or that untasteful, immature, low quality obscenity should go 
without regulation. On the other hand, the opinion does 
recognize that the "indistinct" drawing is in fact "a woman 
reclining in a spread-eagled manner (facing the viewer) so as 
to expose her pubic area." The opinion also recognizes the 
1. Since Turner accepted the jury instructions "as 
constituted," no exceptions, I must conclude that the jury was 
properly instructed regarding applicable law. 
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drawing next to the woman as a large depiction of a woman's 
pubic area but evaluates it as "blurry." These observations 
are highly relevant. This "blurry" drawing (in shades of red 
and pink) graphically depicts all of the external female 
genitalia. This vulva is surrounded by depictions of pubic 
hair done in black. "Genitalia," the word in Miller and the 
St. Georae ordinance, means the reproductive organs, especially 
the external sex organs. The American Heritage Dictionary, 
Second College Edition 553 (1985). Despite the majority's 
protestation in footnote 2 that Turner's depictions might 
resemble something else, Turner testified that they were a nude 
woman and an enlargement of a "girl's vagina." 
Turner's vulva depiction occupies the center of the sheet 
(side to side) with the top of the vulva at the center of,the 
sheet (top to bottom). On the lower half of the sheet, the 
left third is occupied by the words of a question with the nude 
woman underneath. The question done in black over yellow is: 
"Why Not Let 
Some One Else 
Think For You?" 
The upper half of the vulva and pubic hair depiction is 
immediately to the right of the three lines in the question. 
Between the question and the nude woman is: "Tuna Factory x x 
x x" inscribed in a green banner over her head. Between the 
nude woman and the vulva is a small sign post with the words 
"Tunnel of Love" and a yellow atrow points from the sign to the 
lower half of the vulva and pubic hair. Underneath the vulva 
and hair are the words "Keep Out" in red. To the right of the 
vulva and hair in black are the words: 
"It's 
Mine 
All Mine" 
The upper half of the sheet has these slogans across the top 
(left to right): "My Right to the World," "Your (sic) Afraid 
Face It" and HLive For Yourself" and a round bomb with "Drugs" 
inscribed on it. Underneath these items and across the lower 
portion of the upper half (left to right) are a skull, a 
swastika, a "13," a happy face, and a shield with "AA" on it. 
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The majority disposes of the juryfs verdict by virtue of a 
"hard core" attack (without defining hard core) and by use 
of a "loose" definition of the scope of appellate review in 
mounting the attack. Their opinion, citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 
418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), states that "the jury is not allowed 
unbridled discretion" in making its obscenity determination. 
Then the majority claims that Jenkins demonstrates that the 
appellate court should "not hesitate to invade the province of 
the jury" and to "substitute its judgment" for the jury's 
judgment because the jury "does not have sole discretion" to 
make the obscenity determination. I will first discuss scope 
of appellate review and then address the meaning of "hard core" 
and the "average person test" in response to the above 
posturing of the main opinion. Later in my opinion I will 
reach the main opinion's backup position regarding the context 
of Turner's work taken "as a whole." 
I agree that the jury does not have unbridled discretion 
in an obscenity case. But I also note that my appellate 
colleagues do not have unbridled discretion on review. Our 
function is to restrict both the legal and factual 
determinations to the constitutional guidelines set forth in 
Miller. Miller states that the elements of obscenity—prurient 
interest, patent offensiveness and lack of serious value—are 
to be determined by the trier of fact, i.e., the jury. 413 
U.S. at 2 6 & n.9; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 
291, 308 (1977). Further, prurient interest and patent 
offensiveness are to be measured by the test of an average 
person in the community applying contemporary community 
standards, which I will discuss in detail below. Thus, we must 
give the jury's findings on those elements a fair measure of 
deference, particularly in a close case. That does not mean 
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable. 
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. But, " [determinations of prurient 
interest and patent offensiveness, and also, therefore, of 
contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that 
the major determination should be made by the jury, except in 
the more extreme cases." F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity at 
150-51 (1976)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter Schauer]. Since 
the serious value element is to be measured by a "reasonable 
person" standard, this determination is more amenable to 
appellate review. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. 
[I]t is also significant to note the 
further indication of this decision 
[Bantling vt United States, 418 u.s. 87 
(1974)] that although all of the elements 
of the Supreme Court's obscenity tests 
have a constitutional basis, only the 
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[serious] value standard is really a 
question of fundamental constitutional 
rights. The Other tests 9re mainly 
questions of fact requiring a less rigid 
standard of review. 
Schauer at 125 (emphasis added). 
Because the majority fails to recognize the proper scope of 
appellate review, it answers the wrong question. Thus, the 
analysis quickly adopts a finding that Turner's "renderings are 
not public portrayals of hard core sexual conduct", i.e., the 
renderings are not obscene. Our function is not to answer the 
question of whether Turner's materials are obscene—as the 
majority has done. Our function is to answer the question of 
whether Turner's materials created a jury question as to 
obscenity—as the majority has not done. 
The appellate court should review each Miller element and 
determine as to that element whether a jury issue has been 
created. Instead, the majority disposes of the jury's obscenity 
verdict by exercise of their own "hard core" judgment. 
A. The "Hard Core" Judgment 
In Huffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit correctly observed that prior to 1971, the United States 
Supreme Court had not defined the term "hard core" 
pornography.2 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.9 
(1971) rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court 
did not define "hard core" until 1973 in Miller which set forth 
specific examples. If material which has failed to pass the 
Miller tests for obscenity looks like something different than 
Miller's examples, then the jury or trial judge has erred in 
application of at least one of the tests. Schauer at 113. The 
main opinion relies on Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162 
(1974) as the basis of its obscenity determination, holding that 
Turner's drawings do not depict "hard core" sexual conduct. But 
2. The main opinion relies on Huffman, a pre-Jliiifit and 
pre-Jenkins circuit case for language to support its "hard coreH 
pornography argument. See nn. 7 & 8. Further, the opinion 
utilizes Huffman to support its scope of review position. 
the opinion fails to examine the meaning of "hard core."J Thus, 
before examining our case in the light of Jenkins, I turn to 
Miller for the definitive meaning of "hard core." 
Miller states "for the first time since Roth fv. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476J was decided in 1957, a majority of this 
Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core* 
pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment." 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Miller guidelines 
include concrete examples of "hard core" materials. One of 
those examples is "lewd exhibition of the genitals." I&. at 
25. This example isolates as "hard core" the very materials 
described in the St. George ordinance and exhibited by Turner. 
His depictions and descriptions consist of genital imagery and 
sexual conduct. Since Miller, the depiction of sexual conduct 
does not necessarily require motion or activity. Jenkins 
3. Miller states that under its holding "no one will be subject 
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials 
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 
'hard core* sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
regulating state law. . . . " Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. "Depict" 
means to present a lifelike image of. Roaet's II, The New 
Thesaurus 246 (1980). "Describe" means to give a verbal account 
of. Id. at 250. Thus, "hard core" sexual conduct can be 
presented in images or words. 
4. Professor Schauer has state,d: 
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court 
specifically stated that only the 
depiction of "hard-core" sexual conduct 
may be prohibited. As examples of what 
might be included, the Court indicated the 
following: 
(a) Patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated. 
(b) Patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of 
masturbation, excretory functions, 
and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 
This definition seems to make it clear 
that hard-core pornography may include 
things other than actual sexual congress 
or activity, contrary to the views of a 
15 
states that "we made it plain that under that holding fMiller! 
'no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure 
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe 
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct . . . . ' " 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added)(quoting Miller, 413 
U.S. at 27) . 
Jenkins reiterates the following definitions of "hard core" 
as first set forth in Miller: 
We also took pains in Miller to 
"give a few plain examples of what a state 
statute could define for regulation under 
part (b) of the standard announced," that 
is, the requirement of patent 
offensiveness. I&., at 25, 93 S.Ct., at 
2615. These examples include 
"representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated," and "representations 
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibition Of the 
genitals." Ibid- While this did not 
purport to be an exhaustive catalog of 
what juries might find patently offensive, 
it was certainly intended to fi* 
substantive constitutional limitations, 
deriving from the Fir,st Amendment, on the 
type of material subject to such a 
determination. It would be wholly at odds 
with this aspect of Miller to uphold an 
obscenity conviction based upon a 
defendant's depiction of a woman with a 
bare midriff, even though a properly 
charged jury unanimously agreed on a 
verdict of guilty. 
(Footnote 4 continued) 
number of other courts prior to Miller. 
These views seemed based primarily on the 
BfilitllE [vt New YorK, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)] 
reversals of the Supreme Court, since for 
a number of years after 1967 the Court 
reversed any obscenity conviction where 
the material did not display actual sexual 
activity, regardless of the lewd or 
suggestive poses of individual models. 
Schauer at 111. 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added). Jenkins was a 
"bare midriff" case. Our case is not. Miller does not mention 
bare midriffs or mere nudity. Miller specifically defines lewd 
exhibition of the "genitals." This is our case. In Jenkins 
the Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledge and observed: 
While the subject matter of the picture 
is, in a broader sense, sex, and there are 
scenes in which sexual conduct including 
"ultimate sexual acts" is to be understood 
to be taking place, the camera does not 
focus on the bodies of the actors at such 
times. There is no exhibition whatever of 
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, 
during these scenes. There are occasional 
scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not 
enough to make material legally obscene 
under the Miller standards, 
Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
Having observed that the film depicted "nudity" only and 
not "genitals", the Supreme Court held that "the film could 
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. . . . " Id. at 
161. Jenkins and Miller both tell us what can be defined as 
"hard core," i.e., lewd exhibition of the genitals. Jenkins 
tells us one thing that can not be considered "hard core," 
i.e., a bare midriff. Jenkins pimply does not grant my 
colleagues discretion on review to hold as a matter of 
constitutional law that Turner's depictions and exhibition of 
female genitalia were clearly not obscene and did not create an 
issue for the jury. To the contrary, Jenkins and Miller stand 
for the proposition that St. George could define, and prohibit 
as "hard core" obscenity, the lewd exhibition of the 
genitals—even if only by "representation." Miller. 413 U.S. 
at 25. The St. George ordinance adopted the Miller 
definition. Professor Schauer has stated: 
But now, after Miller, it is clear that 
hard-core pornography may include material 
which does not depict sexual acts, and 
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" is 
specifically included. This should be 
interpreted in the light of a number of 
lower court cases defining hard-core 
pornography to include photographs which 
focus on, exaggerate, or emphasize the 
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genitalia or "erogenous zones." It is 
this exaggeration or "highlight" on the 
genitalia which often distinguishes 
hard-core pornography from mere nudity. 
Schauer at 111-112. 
Turner elected to exhibit materials which highlight and 
amplify female genitalia, one of Miller's specific examples of 
"hard core." In fact, Turner described the vulva drawing as: 
"It's supposed to be a very-enlarged portion of the girl's 
pubic area" and the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's 
vagina." Turner's depictions are a form of hard core 
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed 
depictions set forth in Miller and the St. George ordinance. 
Accordingly, Turner's materials were sufficient to clearly 
present a jury issue as to obscenity. As promised, I now turn 
to further consideration of the average person test because the 
majority has not given proper deference to this test and has 
substituted their own personal judgments for that of the jury. 
B. The Average Person Test 
i^  Test Applies to Prurient Interest and Patently Offensive 
Elements 
In 1957, Roth replaced the "most susceptible" person test 
of obscenity with the "average person" test. Miller reaffirmed 
this test by reciting Roth: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact 
must be: (a) whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" 
would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489). 
The Miller Court rejected a national "community standard" 
as an exercise in futility. In so doing, the Court relied on 
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184 (1964) which stated: 
It is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First 
Amendment as requiring that the people of 
Maine or Mississippi accept public 
depiction of conduct found tolerable in 
Las Vegas, or New York City. People in 
different States vary in their tastes and 
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be 
strangled by the absolutism of imposed 
uniformity. 
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted). 
In accord with the above rationale, the Miller Court held 
"that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary 
community standards', 'not national standards1." Miller, 413 
U.S. at 31-32. Miller analyzed this new standard in relation 
to both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness 
tests. Both of those tests require a less rigid standard of 
review because they are principally questions of fact. The 
jurors are to apply this standard as would the average person 
in their community. Accordingly, the jurors' analytical 
process is as follows: (1) determine, from their own knowledge 
of the community, the sense of the average person in the 
community; (2) determine from their own knowledge of the 
community contemporary community standards; (3) apply those 
standards to the work in question and make judgments regarding 
appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. If 
these judgments by the jury are in the affirmative, the work is 
obscene. If either of these judgments is in the negative, the 
work is not obscene. Thus, only the serious value element of 
Miller presents a question regarding fundamental constitutional 
rights. S_S£, e.g. , Schauer at, 125. If the work is obscene, 
the jury then determines whether it has serious value which 
would save it. This is done by applying the reasonable person 
test. Pope v. Illinois. 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
2^ The Average Person 
Who is the mysterious average person? He or she is 
neither the most immune nor the most susceptible. "[Ojbscenity 
is to be judged according to the average person in the 
community/ rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant." 
Smith Vt United States, 431 u.s. 291, 304 (1977). The Miller 
opinion stated the primary concern in requiring a jury to apply 
this standard is that the material "will be judged by its 
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly 
susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally 
insensitive one." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33- I note the 
continuing emphasis that it is the individual juror who must 
divine the standards of the average person in the local 
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community. Because this factual judgment is to be exercised by 
the peer juror, the prosecution need not produce "expert" 
witnesses to testify as to obscenity. Kaplan v. California, 
413 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1973). The juror knows as well as any 
expert who the average person is and what the contemporary 
community standards are. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 
413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973). The Supreme Court has stated: 
A juror is entitled to draw on his own 
knowledge of the views of the average 
person in the community or vicinage from 
which he comes for making the required 
determination, just as he is entitled to 
draw on his knowledge of the propensities 
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of 
the law. 
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974), quoted in 
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302. 
This standard requires each juror to tap his or her 
knowledge of his or her community in deciding what obscenity 
conclusion the average person in the community, applying 
contemporary community standards, would reach in a particular 
case. Thus, the appellate judge has a formidable, if not 
impossible task, in second guessing the juror's personal draw 
on his or her "knowledge of the community." How does the 
appellate judge divine the sense of the average person in a 
distant community where the appellate judge does not reside or 
has little, if any, personal knowledge of community mores on 
which to draw? Expert witnesses? Not required. "[I]n 'the 
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since 
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves 
for the determination of the question.'" Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 
122 (quoting Ginzbura v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 
(1966)). How about the local statute? Introduced here. 
Helpful evidence, but not conclusive. "[T]he local statute on 
obscenity provides relevant evidence of the mores of the 
community whose legislative body enacted the law." Smith, 431 
U.S. at 308. Smith held, as did Miller, that the issues of 
prurient interest and patent offensiveness "are fact questions 
for the jury, to be judged in the light of the jurors' 
understanding of contemporary community standards." Id. at 
300-01. Thus, we see that the jury is uniquely qualified to 
exercise this particular judgment, i.e., the average person 
applying contemporary community standards. They must "consider 
the entire community and not simply their own subjective 
reactions or the reactions, of a sensitive or of a callous 
minority." Id. at 305. And in this case, my appellate 
colleagues have little evidence of local community standards 
other than the juror's judgment which has been exercised.5 
Here, the basic evidence of community mores was each juror's 
personal knowledge of local standards and the St. George 
ordinance. The St. George ordinance contains the Miller 
definitions of hard core obscenity. The ordinance is 
substantial evidence of a community standard that genitalia 
will not be lewdly depicted and displayed to the public. 
Turner elected to exhibit genitalia, as proscribed, to the 
unwarned members of the public including juveniles who entered 
his place of business. His public exhibition of hard core 
materials created questions for the jury regarding prurient 
interest and patent offensiveness. The jury applied the 
"average person" test under contemporary community standards 
and found in the affirmative. Again, the majority has not 
definitively answered the question of whether a jury question 
had been created on these issues. Instead, the majority, 
without acknowledging the "average person" test simply 
substitutes their individual judgments for the judgments 
exercised by the jury and summarily announce their own factual 
findings (dressed up as conclusions of law) in the negative 
stating: 
Because we conclude . . . that the 
drawings themselves do not appeal to the 
prurient interest and are not patently 
offensive and because the drawings 
rationally relate to the rest of the 
collage . . . taken as a whole . . . we 
find the drawings are not in violation of 
the St. George Ordinance. 
TURNER'S WORK "AS A WHOLE" 
Since the majority concluded that Turner's work failed the 
"hard core" requirement, that should have been the end of the 
5. The defense called four witnesses ostensibly to testify 
regarding community standards. One had purchased some "mens'" 
magazines at some convenience stores in Washington County. 
Another had seen "R" rated movies in St. George, including Sea 
of Love and Skin Deep, but no "X" rated movies. One indicated 
that there were literary works available in Southern Utah which 
contained the "F" word, and the last described the place of 
nudes in 20th century art. None testified as "experts" nor 
stated "expert opinions" regarding community standards. 
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opinion, as in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) on which 
they rely. Nevertheless, the opinion tries to further save the 
work from the jury's obscenity determination by analyzing 
Turner's work "as a whole."6 
A. Context or Unit of Perception 
Obscenity cases have dealt with a book, a movie, a 
magazine article, a cartoon, a brochure, each as a unit of 
perception. What material displayed by Turner is the logical 
6. The majority tries to save Turner's work from the jury's 
obscenity determination by relying completely on the curious 
per curiam case of Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). for 
its "as a whole" analysis. I observe some problems with'this 
reliance on Kois. 
First, Kois was a pre-Miller case. Kois is divided into 
two sections using different analyses to dispose of two 
separate criminal offenses: (1) an underground newspaper 
article which included a photo of a nude couple embracing and 
(2) a book of poems which included a poem describing sexual 
intercourse. 
Second, since Kois was a pre-Miller, "national" community 
standards case, the Supreme Court's scope of review was broader 
than it would be post-Miller, applying "local" community 
standards. 
Third, Miller requires a different analytical approach 
than was applied in the sex poem section of Kois. There, the 
Court looked at the "artistic" value of the poem in question 
and considered it to be in the realm of "serious art." From 
that premise, the Court decided the dominant theme of the poem 
did not appeal to the prurient interest. Under Miller "serious 
value" of the work is examined last and only after the work has 
failed the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests. 
If so, "serious value" is examined to determine if the work has 
value which can save it. 
7. The trial judge, the jurors and the appellate judges should 
observe the complete "work" as a unit of perception. See 
generally Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (book); 
Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (movie); Penthouse 
Intern.t Ltd. v, McAuliffe, 6io F.2d 1353 (5th cir.), cert. 
dismissed/ 447 U.S. 931 (1980) (magazine); Paoish v. Board of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam)(political cartoon); 
Hamlina v. United States. 418 U.S. 87 (1984) (advertising 
brochure). 
unit of perception? The prosecution offered two separate 
sheets as units of perception each depicting offensive 
material. Turner testified that one of the sheets which 
contained, among other slogans and depictions, the words "Group 
Sex" and "Eat It, Eat Me" was prepared four years earlier as 
part of a Halloween motif. Accordingly, it did not bear any 
time relation or context relation to the other sheet depicting 
the nude and vulva. Further, Turner's counsel argued to the 
trial court that the two sheets were "totally" separate and 
different works. The main opinion disregards Turner's view and 
identifies Turner's "hard rock record store," including the 
"collage" of wall hangings, as the unit of perception. I agree 
with Turner and his counsel that the logical unit of perception 
is to view each of Turner's sheets as separate "paintings" or 
works. Turner's painting (sheet depicting the nude female and 
vulva), described in detail in my "facts" section above', is the 
work or unit of perception at issue in this case. Thus, the 
single sheet is the "work" to be "taken as a whole" in the 
analysis. 
B. Dominant Theme 
The question to be asked by trial judge, jury and 
appellate judge is: 
whether the objectionable materials are 
related to text or other materials which 
are themselves constitutionally protected, 
or whether the text'[or other materials 
are] merely asserted as a sham to attempt 
to shield commercial pornography in a 
cloak of legitimacy. 
Schauer at 106. 
Turner was unable to articulate any text or theme for the 
materials on his painting exclusive of the nude and vulva. His 
testimony reveals that he had no clear theme. He was not sure, 
but he believed his painting "resembles political commentary." 
Even Turner's brief concedes that the theme of his "bed sheets 
is admittedly difficult to identify precisely.- Thus, the 
jury, applying the "average person test" could reasonably 
conclude that the objectionable sexual depictions and 
descriptions could not possibly relate to the other materials 
on the sheet because they were themeless, i.e., a diverse 
collection of ideas. Further, even if the other materials set 
forth a clear "political" theme, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the "sexual" materials had nothing to do with 
politics. Moreover, since Turner testified that the two sexual 
depictions were the first materials placed on the sheets (and 
the other materials added later had no theme or were not 
related, if they had a theme), the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that the materials added to the top of the sheet were 
indeed a sham attempt by Turner to insulate or shield obscene 
material (the lower half of the sheet) with non-obscene 
material. Turner could not identify a dominant theme.8 Since 
he could not, the jury had a basis on which to conclude that 
Turner's "themeless" materials were merely a sham attempt to 
insulate his "objectionable" materials. 
This would occur, for example, if the most 
obscene items conceivable were inserted 
between each of the books of the Bible. 
But under existing law, the judges and 
juries are able to identify shams in which 
non-obscene material is used as a vehicle 
to insulate obscene material. As 
established in Ginzburq, the "taken as a 
whole" test is not quantitative. Under 
Miller, even one obscene item contained in 
a work would be sufficient to support a 
finding that the entire publication is 
obscene if, "taken as a whole," the 
publication lacks serious value. The 
"taken as a whole" test is not 
inconsistent with the recognition of shams. 
Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted). 
Norrff&n H. Jacksor^Judge 
8. The majority creates a "rational relationship" among 
Turner's diverse "political, philosophical, musical, social and 
sexual themes" by calling his work a collage. Thus, several 
entirely unrelated themes are made the "dominant theme" of the 
majority with the store as the "context." Accordingly, the 
offensive depictions, as part of the collage, in this large 
context, are simply meaningless, i.e., not obscene. 
